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Abstract  
For a number of years, new material feminists have been developing new theoretical 
tools, new modes of conceptual analysis and new ethical frameworks. Object-oriented 
ontology, part of the speculative realism ‘movement’, has been engaged in something 
similar. Yet these endeavours have often taken place in ‘parallel universes’, despite 
sharing – or at least colliding around – a range of somewhat similar ontological and 
epistemological commitments. Composed as a diffractive musing encounter, the article 
brings Barad’s Meeting the Universe Halfway, already a ‘foundational’ text for new 
material feminism, into an encounter with a speculative realist text of the same 
‘foundational’ status, Harman’s The Quadruple Object. The article develops a notion of 
diffractive musing as embodied, sensory struggle which instantiates intellectual 
generosity as a mode of critique.  
 
Introduction 
Speculative realism first went viral on the internet a couple of years ago and is now making 
itself felt in academic articles and books. I came to speculative realism via my immersion in 
new material feminism and after many years of engaging with feminist theory and politics. 
While feminism continually tuned me into the daily politics of sexism and the need to combat 
these on an everyday basis through our intellectual practices with students as well as our 
individual and collective actions on the bus, in our homes, workspaces and in the streets, new 
material feminism had enlivened my senses, bringing to the fore engagement with the world 
as bodymind entanglement. It had propelled me, via the promise of diffraction, into a creative 
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imaginary for thinking otherwise, and into pondering how, if we are thinking otherwise, we 
might also be reading and writing academic articles otherwise. More specifically, new 
material feminism touches me, presses on my skin as sensorium, with its invitation that 
knowledge is a material-discursive co-constitution by all sorts of agents not just human 
agents. It impels me to worry about and try to work out how to affectively and ethically 
embody mattering as an entangled responsibility for the actions we take (however small) 
which enact differences that matter for humans, nonhumans and other-than-humans alike 
(Barad, 2007). It is perhaps worth stating here that the material feminism I activate in this 
article differs from an ‘earlier’ incarnation of material feminism which, in its alliance with 
Marxist historical materialism, is principally concerned with the gendered inequalities 
entailed in the reproduction of capitalist modes of social and economic organisation.  
However, as Lenz Taguchi (2013) makes clear, it is also to be differentiated from a ‘renewed’ 
materialist phenomenological account on two fronts: one, because renewed materialism 
continues to privilege human subjects’ experience of matter in relation to what matter affords 
or enables humans to do; and two, because it explains material relations by resurrecting a 
mode of subjectivity based on conscious acts of making meaning which continue to gesture to 
a transcendent dimension with its hidden structures of truth or meaning beyond the human. 
So, although offering a valuable corrective to social constructionism, a renewed materialist 
phenomenological account ‘still takes the human subject as a starting point, and thus produces 
a negative and dialectical ontology’ (Lenz Taguchi, 2013, p. 711).  In contrast, in the 
Baradian-inspired ‘new’ material feminism I invoke, matter is not ‘given’ to the human but 
rather acts on its own terms in an emergent, contingent and dynamic practice of 
materialization which includes human and nonhuman bodies and gives rise to unpredictable, 
if sometimes enduring, assemblages and conglomerations. ‘New’ material feminism undoes 
the binary separation of knowing and being; and it troubles concepts of will, intention and 
agency, recognizing them not as individual possessions, nor as manifestations of the 
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negotiated pull of structure and agency as in social constructionism, but as force, flow, affect 
and intensity distributed across a multiplicity of different human-nonhuman modalities.  
 
Furthermore, the ‘weirdness’ of Barad’s quantum physics promised a queer(y)ing that could 
undo identity by unmooring the fixed coordinates of time, place and space through an 
emergent ‘dynamic relationality between continuity and discontinuity’ (Barad, 2010, p. 244), 
Specifically, the word ‘weirdness’ produced an errant wandering to the concept of 
‘enweirding’ and the agency of objects, from which I went to Ian Bogost’s (2012) book on 
‘alien phenomenology’, and then from Bogost to Graham Harman’s (2011) theory of object-
oriented ontology, which is either an offshoot of speculative realism, its overarching field, or 
its origin, depending on who you read. The affinities between speculative realism and 
material feminism seemed immediately apparent: both theories proposed a realist ontology, 
albeit inflected differently and refracted through different disciplinary histories and 
epistemological affiliations; both questioned human exceptionalism and thereby (implicitly in 
the case of object-oriented ontology and explicitly in the case of material feminism) offered 
posthuman principles and allegiances, again differently inflected; and both opened new, 
radical ways of knowing and being by, variously en-weirding, diffracting or queer(y)ing 
knowledge production.  
 
But, at this early point, some considerable differences also seemed immediately apparent. For 
all her theoretical abstraction, Barad’s world is a place of human-and-more-and-other-than 
human flesh, blood and bone entanglements. Her concerns are to do with the materialisation 
and force of differences that matter in a ‘worlding’ of entangled relationality, that is, an ethic 
of being with/in the world. For Harman and Bogost, objects ‘withdraw’ from us. Neither seem 
at all interested in the ‘livingness’ of things but with abstract concepts, in which re-reading 
the work of the philosophical fathers seem to take precedence over ethical praxis. As a 
feminist, this worried me (and there is more to come in what follows on the other worries that 
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speculative realism provoked). Nevertheless, the affinities and dissonances between 
speculative realism and material feminism continued to intrigue me, and I was encouraged by 
Hird’s comment (2013, p. 365) that ‘a conversation between feminist science studies and 
critical theory, speculative realism and object oriented philosophy is overdue’ to pursue these 
wondering-wanderings further.  
 
First Passage to Critique: Em/bodied Diffractive Musing  
Em/Bodied 
 
bell hooks (1994, p. 192) notes that the legacy of the Cartesian cogito in educational practice 
has meant the erasure of the body in order that we may ‘give ourselves over more fully to the 
mind’ such that the normalized, governing assumption is ‘that passion has no place in the 
classroom’. And not just the classroom. It often seems that passion has no place in academic 
writing either, as we bend our thoughts, bodies and emotions to producing another star-rated 
journal ‘output’, engage in the never-ending pursuit for diminishing, and increasingly 
competitive, research funds, and burnish our public profiles on social media – meanwhile 
exhausting our passion in favour of commoditized, entrepreneurial academic productivity. 
Yet, in opposition to this climate, and the concomitant propulsion in much (though not all) 
mainstream academic writing towards an ‘ablution of language’ (Minh-ha, 1989, p. 17) in 
which (it is assumed) transparency of thought can be represented in the cold light of day on 
the dispassionate page, the forces of passionate attachment are ranged. These forces en-
courage us – give us heart to – resist the tyranny that requires academic writing to display 
Depth, Surface, Essence Appearance, and Competence in favour of instantiating the practices 
of Performance, Authenticity, Pretence, Truth, Lies (MacLure, 2005) which, although often 
castigated as ‘frivolous’, are more likely as practices to help recover some of the gleeful fun 
of playing with ideas that Derrida thought should be the provenance of universities (Myerson, 
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1997). It may be that such writing is risky. It may be, as Barthes’s (1953, p. 16–17) notes, that 
writing which works against the modes established ‘under the pressure of History and 
Tradition’ may be ‘a mere moment’. It may also be that such writing provides examples of 
personal commitment and imagination that Sword (as cited in Badley, 2011, p. 264) thought 
was needed. The exemplars for doing this are beginning to multiply – but how might I do 
this? 
 
Sensorializing Mazzei and Jackson’s (2012) concept of knowing-in-being is for me one way 
forward; one way to contest the assumed separation of mind and body, and unravel the notion 
that unreason attends and inheres in the (female) body while freeing the mind, as purer 
substance, for intellection (Grosz, 1994). Instead, thinking with/in/from the plurality of the 
sensory body generates differing modes of apprehension which, at least for me, are not those 
of the monstrous workbench in which I tongue the corpse of severed data (Holmes, 2014), but 
an immanent sensory melody in which I hear-feel the deafening thrum of ‘all the bells of 
noon’, touch the ongoing rush and flush of flowing matter, breeze in the alive-ness of all 
things and beings. Being-in-the-moment, as a Buddhist might say. Aiming to apprehend in 
skin-mouth-eyes-fingertips the joy of the world in its intra-active becoming, as Barad (2007) 
might say. Such sensory knowing is, as Pink (2009) noted, embodied and emplaced. This 
(my) body is a specific body – here-now – but I attempt not to separate movement from seat-
work (Daza and Huckaby, 2014) because I have a bad back which any stasis exacerbates. As I 
sit and write I move continually, attending to the micro-movements that occur, propelled into 
critique as the sensory joyousness of adventitious seeking, the hard-sought-after-going-on, 
gathering ‘materials’ in my getting-heavier pockets as I go, assembling ‘stuff’, turning 
‘things’ over in my hands, enmeshed in the haecceity of moments, rather than worrying about 
the getting ‘there’ (wherever ‘there’ is) and having arrived, sorting, arranging, pinning, 
finicking. Such sensory knowing continually unfinishes academic writing because the road is 
made by walking. Thus, I think with Latour (2004, p. 246) that:         
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The direction of critique [is] not away but toward the gathering … Critique [should] be 
associated with more, not less, with multiplication, not subtraction.  
 
Such more-ish-ness becomes a taste on the tongue, an embodied experiment in writing which 
changes my thinking while changing ‘me’ (Bridges-Rhoads, 2015).   
 
Diffractive 
 
A diffractive reading … spreads thought and meaning in unpredictable and productive 
emergences (Mazzei, 2014, p. 742).  
 
Theories […] matter, they induce difference into the intra-active becoming of the world. They 
matter because they are diffractive (Seghal, 2014, p. 197).  
 
Diffraction is not a singular event that happens in space and time; rather, it is a dynamism that 
is integral to spacetimemattering. Diffractions are untimely. Time is … broken apart in 
different directions, non- contemporaneous with itself. Each moment is an infinite 
multiplicity. ‘Now’ is not an infinitesimal slice but an infinitely rich condensed node in a 
changing field diffracted across spacetime in its ongoing iterative repatterning (Barad, 2014, p. 
169).  
 
The visionary potential of diffraction makes ‘a mapping of interference, not of replication, 
reflection, or reproduction’. Diffractive mappings are not rationally made, because the 
productivity of diffraction comes from elsewhere (van der Tuin, 2014, p. 236).   
 
Critique is not just a reflection that leaves what it reflects upon unaltered, but a diffraction that 
changes what is put under critical scrutiny (Folkers, 2014, p. 17).  
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These five ways of looking at diffraction indicate the generative momentum of this concept as 
a way for thinking, doing, researching, being and becoming in productively different ways. I 
wish, like Stevens with his thirteen ways of looking at a blackbird (why 13? Only 13?), I 
could include more diffractive appreciations not simply to attest to its conceptual mobility, 
but also as an incantatory device in urging diffraction as a research practice which renders 
‘methods’ as tools, ‘analysis’ as coding, and ‘methodology’ as a thinking frame for research 
obsolete. As Barad (2007, p. 30) notes, diffraction ‘does not fix what is the object and what is 
the subject in advance’, which puts Heidegger’s (1962, p. 24) point that ‘every inquiry is a 
seeking. Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought’ somewhat out of joint. 
Diffraction en-courages us (gives us heart) to pay greater attention to research as an emergent 
enactment of materially-embodied socio-political practices, and to the cuts, boundaries and 
differences we co-constitutively produce through knowledge enactments.  
 
Sensory knowing – that is, embodied diffractive musing as I develop it in this article – arises 
with/in the diffractive feminist ‘her/story’ told so well in recent journal special issues (Gender 
and Education, 2013, Vol. 25, Issue 4; Parallax Volume 20, Number 3, 2014, for example). 
This her/story pays homage to Haraway as the ‘founding feminist mother’ of this concept, and 
her re-visioning of the masculine gaze of optics that diffraction his/torically tells, and to 
Barad’s appropriation of diffraction as both a quantum phenomenon relating to interference 
patterns and a useful metaphor for methodological practices that entail ‘the processing of 
small but consequential differences’ which interfere with, contest and undo canonical tales, 
preferred readings, and dominant discourses. This her/story points up how ‘different 
differences get made, what gets excluded, and how these exclusions matter’ (Barad, 2007, p. 
29–30). Doing diffraction in this vein brings to mind a small (?) undoing of the masculine 
his/tory of optics: I re-member that Spinoza was a philosopher-craftsman whose practical 
philosophy led him to the notion that ‘interacting with things and understanding things cannot 
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be separated’ (Hurley, 1988, p. ii); that ‘the units of understanding are not propositions but 
acts’; which led Deleuze (1988, p. 13) to suggest that Spinoza’s affirmative philosophy had 
‘enough confidence in life to denounce all the phantoms of the negative’. This re-minds me 
that in doing diffraction ‘one never commences; one never has a tabula rasa; one slips in; 
enters in the middle; one takes up or lays down rhythms’ (Deleuze, 1988, p. 123). Doing 
diffraction as sensory melody is, then, a becoming-movement towards embodying the figure 
of the ‘boarding-house lodger’, as Deleuze (1988, p. 4) characterized Spinoza, that is, one 
who ‘solicits forces in thought that elude obedience as well as blame’.  
 
Musing 
Meditative contemplation; thoughtful abstraction; critique as intellectual food; gustatory 
thinking. 
 
Musing as slow theory. Not theory which is developed at snail’s pace, but rather theory which 
partakes of the slow movement’s commitment to deceleration, consumption reduction, ethical 
environmentalism, and the nurturing of non-commercial forms of well-being. While Honore 
(2005) is its most famous popularizer, perhaps the slow movement’s ecological impulses as 
found in slow cities, slow food, slow design (Fuad-Luke, 2007) have something useful for the 
development of critique as diffractive musing. Roberts (2013) notes that a slow education 
would focus on ‘deceleration, patience, and immersive attention’. Diffractive musing as slow 
theorising may help deterritorialize critique for those practices of ‘working the limits’ that 
Mazzei (2014) thinks necessary. Perhaps by valuing contemplation more in the unhurried 
spacetimemattering of doing, reading and writing critique we may also attend to the pulsing 
sense of immersive joy that comes-with emergent thinking. So that, like Deleuze and Guattari 
(1994, p. 212), we might say that ‘contemplating is creating’, it is an event that occurs 
‘meanwhile’ and which ‘belongs to becoming [because] nothing happens there, but 
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everything becomes’ (ibid, p. 158). The longue durée of contemplative creation does not 
constitute musing as an apolitical practice. On the contrary, it provokes careful attention to 
‘ideas’ as ‘technologies for pursuing inquiries’ (Haraway, 2008, p. 282). Musing critique 
directs a keener analytical gaze towards the ‘mark a minute’ cultures of postsecondary 
assessment regimes, and to contemporary university practices which condition bodies to 
accord with the finitude of ‘resource envelopes’.    
 
Second Passage to Critique: Reading and Writing Which Maximizes 
 
In his engagements with other philosophers and writers  – Hume, Bergson, Spinoza, Proust, 
Foucault – Deleuze was seeking a reading which maximizes.  Such a reading, according to 
Hurley (1988, p. iii) is an invitation to ‘come as you are – and read with a different attitude’, 
one more akin to the way we approach poetry. A reading which maximizes is less concerned 
with seeking a ‘full’ analysis (an illusion anyway and always) and is more about an affective 
reading which, as Hurley notes, ‘may be more practical’. Writing in this mode is ‘not a 
solitary pleasure [because there is] a connection between you and the material’ (Winterson, 
2014); it becomes an act of ‘receiving’ and ‘transmitting’, a form of ‘telepathy’ even, such 
that ‘we’re not even in the same year together, let alone the same room … except we are 
together. We’re close. We’re having a meeting of the minds’ (King, 2000, p. 115–117). Of 
course, thinking this ‘meeting’ as a maximizing of diffractively em/bodied sensory knowing 
assuredly does not return us to the disembodiment of individualised cognition. Instead, its 
musing mode works to instantiate the nonhuman with/in us. A diffractive reading and writing 
which maximizes focuses subjectivity as multiplicity and recasts Burman and MacLure’s 
(2005, p. 288) ‘necessary … but not necessarily paralyzing’ question ‘who am I to write this’ 
in a new light in which ‘to write is to struggle and resist; to write is to become; to write is to 
draw a map’ (Deleuze, 1999, p. 38).  
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Above I endorsed Latour’s idea that the direction of critique is toward the gathering, the 
multiplication. Latour (2004, p. 231) argues that this formulation helps critique face away 
from its obsession with deconstructing matters of fact towards a more positive engagement 
with ‘matters of concern’. He proposes that, in dealing with matters of concern, the critic is:   
  
Not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles … the critic is the one for 
whom, if something is constructed, then it means it is fragile and in need of care and 
caution (Latour, 2004, p. 246).   
 
Below, as I diffractively muse on speculative realism and material feminism, I want to 
activate this care and caution by engaging critique as a close encounter of the generous kind. 
The idea of critique as a more generous connection, as intimate association, as getting closer 
to in order to add to, not to take something away, be negative, hostile or destructive, works 
with Barad’s argument that ‘critique is over-rated, over-emphasized, and over-utilized, to the 
detriment of feminism’ (Barad, as cited in Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, p. 49). Critique as 
a serious enterprise of more gentle holding begins with Kirby’s (2011, p. 82) idea that: 
 
The practice of doing critique involves close encounters with another person’s way of 
thinking, intellectual commitments, ‘temperament’ and ‘personal idiosyncrasies that 
animate their writing style.  
 
Thus, a diffractive reading in/between object-oriented ontology and material feminism 
doesn’t aim at a ‘murderous manoeuvre of dialectical reasoning’, as Kirby (2011, p. 83) calls 
it, in order to highlight what is ‘good’, ‘better’ or more advantageous about one approach vis-
à-vis the other, but rather to look at their utility for thinking differently in-between. I am 
mindful of St Pierre’s (2016, f.c.) advice that the best preparation for educational research is 
to study philosophy, not methodology, and she cites Rajchman’s (2000, p. 7) point that:  
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To make connections one needs not knowledge, certainty, or even ontology, but rather a trust 
that something may come out, though one is not yet completely sure what.   
 
In what follows I try to do this. I trust that something may come out but at the moment I write 
this, I am not quite sure what.  
   
Third Passage to Critique: Making Connections/ Soliciting Forces 
I began this paper (a while ago) in a state of pique. My pique arose when I saw that the names 
associated with ‘the movement’ of Speculative Realism (in Harman’s [2013a] view it ought to 
be capitalized as a proper name) were all male, no women; and it seemed to me that the four 
men’s names – Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux, Ray Brassier, and Iain Hamilton Grant 
– the ‘founding fathers’ of the movement – were engaging in a lot of incestuous mutual citing 
(perhaps, my gut told me, to convince themselves there was a ‘movement’). Pique deepened 
to annoyance when I saw a similar thing happening with object-oriented ontology or TripleO 
(founded by Graham Harman, in alliance with Ian Bogost, Levi Bryant, Timothy Morton). 
And expanded when I saw the male philosophical lineage Harman et al. in elaborating 
TripleO invokes: Kant, Husserl, Heidegger. Having witnessed the colonisation of a number of 
emerging fields by masculine interests over the years – the focus in cultural studies on young 
men’s oppositional and resistant subcultures and the lack of academic engagement with girls’ 
subcultures prior to Angela McRobbie’s work is one notable example – I was surprised at 
how much this irritated rather than simply wearied me as an another illustration of the 
ongoing monotony of gendered practices of exclusion.  
 
Added to this, Ray Brassier said that he could see ‘little philosophical merit in a “movement” 
whose most signal achievement thus far is to have generated an online orgy of stupidity’ 
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(cited in Gratton: 2014, p. 3), a comment which encouraged me initially to relegate object-
oriented ontology to a boys-own philosophical hinterland where clubby backslapping 
competed with the virtual violence of macho smackdowns. Others, too, have noted the 
gendered exclusions: O’Rourke (2011) remarks on a reference to speculative realism and 
TripleO as an unfriendly to women ‘sausage fest’, and van de Tuin (2014, p. 231) notes ‘the 
androcentrism of much OOO work,’ although Gratton’s (2014, p. 6) book – the first synoptic 
look at the ‘movement’ – ‘sees no reason to exclude’ some notable women theorists as 
‘disparate thinkers’ questioning correlationism. And then, there is the wariness I felt of 
object-oriented ontology’s claim to the invention of a new philosophical universalism, a 
wariness not helped by the grandiose tone of some of Harman’s (2011, p. 96) writing: his 
concepts, he says, are not ‘a taxonomy of entities, but are four structures of reality in general, 
found everywhere and at all times’. You can see my problem and perhaps you share my 
pique! Here I reached for the comfort of Haraway’s (1991, p. 183) observation regarding the 
‘rarefield realm of epistemology, [of how] what can count as knowledge is policed by 
philosophers codifying cognitive canon law.’   
 
And yet. Nevertheless. Meanwhile.  
 
I was intrigued.   
 
I had to know how Barad’s worlding warped into Bennett’s thingly power into Harman’s 
objects. It seemed like ‘now’ was a good time to tangle with Harman’s object lists which, like 
Barad’s italicised theoretical summaries, affectively struck me as a more endearing stylistic 
tic. Perhaps it was three moments, working their subdued magic, that helped shift me toward 
the more generous reading Kirby feels necessary in close critical encounters.    
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First moment. I remembered Badley’s (2011, p. 262) injunction that joining a community of 
inquiry means engaging in ‘transactions’ with established authors’ texts in order to meet those 
texts from their own critical standpoints.  
 
Second moment. Meeting The Third Table halfway. This is Harman’s (2012) little book 
which uses an anecdote from the British physicist, Arthur Stanley Eddington, to outline 
object-oriented ontology via the ‘everyday table’ that Eddington wrote on, the ‘physical table’ 
composed of atoms, and the ‘third table’ lying ‘between these two others’ (ibid, p. 7). The 
third table, the ‘real table’ is not reducible to quarks or table effects on humans, neither does 
the practical use we make of it exhaust its reality. Its reality is not simply dissolvable into 
small units; it is ‘a genuine reality deeper than any theoretical or practical encounter with it’ 
(ibid, p. 10).    
 
Third moment. Feeling the pulsing energy of a Deleuzian line of flight when Harman (2012, 
p. 12) dismisses the two cultures, which he terms science and social constructionism, of C. P. 
Snow as ‘failures as philosophy.’ proposing instead the ‘third culture’ of art as the only way 
to apprehend the reality of objects. This refreshing ‘beyond binaries’ instant promised a 
creative cartography which spoke to Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994, pp. 202–203) proposal in 
What is Philosophy? for a momentary conjunction of forces in philosophy, art and science 
‘want us to tear open the firmament and … let in a bit of free and windy chaos’.  
 
How to pursue that invitation? Perhaps by a wondering without confirmation (not knowing 
what will ‘come out’), a more generous reading, a musing critique.  
  
Landing Place 1: Realism/ Materialism 
 
A tune upon the blue guitar 
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Of things exactly as they are. 
 
So, that’s life, then: things as they are? 
It picks its way on the blue guitar.  
(from Wallace Stevens, The Man With The Blue Guitar) 
 
Graham Harman has positioned materialism as the ‘hereditary enemy’ of any object-oriented 
philosophy. In the workshop which originated speculative realism as a movement, Harman 
said ‘I’m an anti-materialist … materialism is a kind of idealism’ (Brassier et al., 2007, p. 
398). Three years later, he published an article with the title ‘materialism must be destroyed’ 
(Haman, 2010), and in The Quadruple Object, he wrote:   
 
What makes materialism such a special opponent is that it does not merely undermine or 
overmine the object, but performs both of these manoeuvres simultaneously (Harman, 2011, p. 
13) 
 
Rather than ungenerously thinking that the gentleman doth protest too much, it is worth 
looking at what these dis/avowals intend. Harman makes it clear he is not making a literal call 
for materialism’s eradication. He is using his title as a provocation for thinking in order to 
escape from the loose use of the word ‘materialism’ which, he contends, ‘has been used 
promiscuously for so many theories that to destroy it might mean to destroy every 
philosophical position that exists’ (Harman, 2010, p. 774). He therefore uses his opposition to 
materialism as a means to define the core tenets of his own brand of speculative realism, 
object-oriented ontology. It is interesting to note here that Harman speaks approvingly of 
Bennett’s (2010) materialism in which all things, human, nonhuman and other-than-human, 
are placed on the same ontological footing, given that Bennett has also been rather firmly co-
opted into a range of new material feminist and posthumanist analyses of cultural and 
 15 
educational practices, and we have already seen the antipathy between speculative realism 
and feminism. What Harman specifically approves of in Bennett’s approach is her opposition 
to ‘reduction as a general philosophical method’ and the fact that she ‘dissolves the usual 
strict opposition between free human subjects and inert material slabs’ (Harman, 2010, p. 
774).  
 
This fits with Harman’s critique that materialism is guilty of both undermining and 
overmining the object. A brief explanation: Undermining is a reduction of the object to some 
primary element, principle or substance which itself can be dissolved into nothing but 
qualities, for example, the atom is not an ‘object’ at all but a ‘set of habitually bundled traits’ 
as is the apple, and so is the human (Harman, 2011, p. 14). Think Heraclitus, Empedocles, 
Anaximander. In contrast, overmining is another reduction but one that reduces ‘upward’ by 
positing that ‘objects are important only insofar as they are manifested in the mind’ (Harman, 
2011, p. 11). This is a form of idealism which argues that what we think is ‘real’ is nothing 
other than a surface effect while the ‘really real’ is going on below that. Here Plato’s Forms 
come to mind, as does Marx’s base/superstructure dialectical materialism. But Harman claims 
that overmining also happens in those forms of process philosophy which see objects in terms 
of relations (as in Whitehead), and forms of social constructionism in which objects are the 
product of language, discourse or power (think Foucault, Butler). Harman (2013b, p. 46) has 
also dismissed the let’s-have-our-materialist-cake-and-eat-it position which he calls 
‘duomining’ which dissolves objects ‘simultaneously in two directions’. I will return to this 
concept presently for I think it is here that a key friction between TripleO and new material 
feminism might be located. For Harman, the philosophical way out is to dispense with 
overmining, undermining and duomining materialisms in order to return to a realism that 
resides in the autonomy of objects. Thus, his stated aim in The Quadruple Object: ‘objects 
should be the hero of philosophy’ (Harman, 2011, p. 16).    
 
 16 
The object’s philosophical heroism accords with Harman’s claim that there is a ‘third way’ of 
philosophical thinking, ignored since Kant’s influential view that made things knowable 
through our experience of them. For Harman (2011, p. 15), following Heidegger, this third 
philosophy focuses on ‘the intermediate layer of autonomous objects, that are both actually 
individual and also autonomous from all perception’. In The Quadruple Object, ‘objects’: 
 
‘Include those entities that are neither physical nor even real’ (p. 5).  
 
‘Must be accounted for by ontology’ (p. 5). 
 
‘Not all objects are equally real, but … they are all equally objects’ (p. 5). 
 
‘In its primary sense an object is not used or known, but simply is what it is’ (p. 73). 
 
‘To be an object means to be itself, to enact the reality in the cosmos of which that object 
alone is capable’ (p. 74).  
 
Harman confirms that objects are ‘defined only by their autonomous reality’ (p. 19) and 
because ‘an object is anything that has a unified reality that is autonomous from its wider 
context and also from its own pieces’ (p. 115), then it follows that physical things and minds 
are objects, the European Union is an object, and a hammer is an object (p. 116): ‘Everything 
both inside and outside the mind is an object’ (p. 143), including unicorns (one of Harman’s 
favourite entities) dogs, diamonds and the Dutch East India Company.  
 
Harman’s object-oriented ontology is most notable for its suggestion that ‘objects withdraw’ 
from us and each other into their own inaccessible realms. On this point, early in the life of 
speculative realism, Harman writes of:  
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‘Objects infinitely withdrawing from each other into vacuums and only barely managing to 
communicate across some sort of qualitative bridge’ (Brassier et al., 2007, p. 368).  
 
He reiterates later:  
 
The object is a dark crystal veiled in a private vacuum: irreducible to its own pieces, and 
equally irreducible to its outward relations with other things’ (Harman, 2011, p. 47).  
 
However, although objects recede infinitely, they nevertheless touch, communicate or interact 
with each other, doing so via their sensuous qualities, their surfaces. As Gratton (2014, p. 
100) explains ‘real objects relate “asymmetrically” to other objects through sensuous 
qualities, and this is just as true for the coffee grinds as it is for the human relation of 
knowledge to things themselves’. For speculative realists, objects ‘nest’ within other objects, 
constituting ‘unit operations’ which are not atoms but systems of object conglomerations 
whose operations are ‘always fractal (Bogost, 2012, p. 28). That objects touch explains how 
approximate stabilisations are formed and replicated amidst heterogeneous conjunctions of 
objects but, while objects remain hauntingly near, tangible and felt by each other, they are 
nevertheless ultimately inaccessible and atomized, locked within themselves (Bennett, 2016 
f.c.) But some speculative realists of the TripleO stripe find objects ‘touching’ in another 
sense captured nicely by Bogost’s (2012, p. 28) phrase: ‘these things wonder about one 
another without getting confirmation’ which points to the idea that objects pursue 
philosophical divagation on their existential alone-ness amidst their lively relations and 
atmospheric reverberations. And all we can say to this is: well, maybe, and how could we 
know otherwise?   
 
Bogost (2012, p. 5) confirms that:  
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‘To be a speculative realist, one must abandon the belief that human access sits at the centre of 
being, organizing it and regulating it like an ontological watchmaker.’ 
    
Indeed, the ‘abandonment’ of human access is the thing that joins the speculative realists, who 
otherwise are a disparate bunch with little in common, together: they all want to escape the 
correlationist circle. ‘Correlationism’ is the name Meillassoux (2008) has given to post-
Kantian philosophy – which he calls the Correlationist Era – and which, he argues, is founded 
on the belief that we ‘know’ reality exists because we can think it and, concomitantly, we 
cannot think outside our own being in the world. Along with other speculative realists, 
Harman shares a commitment to stop thinking about how we know reality and focus instead 
on thinking what is real beyond human experience. As a group, they aim to distinguish 
themselves from other philosophical traditions which they argue remain mired in their 
inability to think the real in-itself. Thus, for Harman, Actor Network Theory is praiseworthy 
in introducing an ontology in which objects are recognised as active players in the world 
although, in his view, ANT’s insistence that things exist primarily in their interrelation misses 
the irreducible ‘objectness’ of the world. Speculative realists also agree that ‘we can know 
reality and we can speculate on it’ (Gratton, 2014, p. 7) and Harman’s objects are his 
philosophical take on giving realism its due. So, to summarise: for Harman what is real are 
things – objects; objects are where speculation originates; things are real beyond how humans 
access them; objects can relate to other objects but only to some part of them with other parts 
remaining infinitely withdrawn. The question arises: to what extent is this position shared by 
new material feminism? a point also raised by van der Tuin (2014, p. 232) who notes that 
‘these young fields are generated by a similar philosophical impetus; however, they diverge as 
separate schools of thought.’  
 
 19 
In outlining his approach, Harman (2011, p. 6) is aiming at ‘a new metaphysics able to speak 
of all objects and the perceptual and causal relations in which they become involved’. This 
sounds provocative and exciting yet immediately raises questions: for example, who is doing 
the speaking in this metaphysics, when, why, and how? responses to which seem, to me, to 
raise some rather fatal issues for the ‘objects’ of object-oriented ontology which I pick up 
later (see ‘weirding/worlding’ below). Harman is fully aware that objections to TripleO are 
often made on the erroneous misunderstanding that he is championing ‘equal rights for 
objects’ when it is patently obvious that a rock or carrot, a pen or a sword, blue jeans and 
ipads as ‘inanimate entities [do not] possess the full human toolbox of mental abilities’ (ibid, 
p. 119). Clearly stung by what he refers to as ‘snide objections’, ‘sarcastic comments’ (ibid, p. 
119) and ‘silly’ criticisms (Harman, 2013a, p. 23), Haman makes the important point that:  
 
‘There is no evidence that trees and houses write poetry, suffer nervous breakdowns, or learn 
from their mistakes. The question is whether this obvious difference between humans and 
non-humans deserves to be made into a basic ontological rift’ (emphasis in original) (Harman, 
2011, p. 119).    
 
This is a sound question, and one which also motivates new material feminist understandings 
as I elaborate below. Here, in the first landing place, I have been at pains to describe the 
‘objects’ of object-oriented ontology in some detail partly because it is central to Harman’s 
explanation of why he is so antipathetic to materialism and because the human/non-human 
ontological rift object-oriented ontology wants to get over is shared by new material 
feminism. I now musingly diffract object-oriented ontology via new material feminism and, 
because I suspect the latter may be more familiar to readers of this journal, I will provide just 
a short overview of new material feminism, then focus on the main contours of Barad’s 
account of agential realism as outlined in Meeting the Universe Halfway.  
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Landing Place 2: Materialism/ Realism 
 
New material feminists are no less a disparate bunch than speculative realists. Nevertheless, 
they share a view that matter and discourse are co-constitutive and neither is foundational; 
that matter is agentic; that the human as the principal ground for knowledge production has to 
be displaced; and that all beings come to being through dynamic processes of co-constitutive 
emergence. New material feminists, like speculative realists, adhere to a non-dualist, flat 
ontology, which at the same time reworks epistemology but, unlike speculative realists, they 
have been particularly exercised by ethics as engaged, embodied, situated and gendered 
meaning-making practices which necessarily displace objectivity, ‘truth’ and ‘reason’ – what 
Haraway (1988, p. 581) called ‘the god trick of seeing everything from nowhere’ – as central 
values in social research (Alaimo and Hekman, 2008; Barad, 2007; Bennett, 2010; Coole and 
Frost, 2010; Braidotti 2013). In my own field of education, the implications of material 
feminism have been explored in some depth recently (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012; Taylor and 
Ivinson, 2013; Lenz-Taguchi and Palmer, 2013). I now turn to Barad’s agential realism which 
maps a particular cartography for new material feminism.  
 
It is perhaps first worth tackling head on the realism of agential realism. Barad (2007, p. 56) 
states that hers is:  
 
A non-representationalist form of realism that is based on an ontology that does not 
take for granted the existence of ‘words’ and ‘things’ and an epistemology that does not 
subscribe to a notion of truth based on their correct correspondence. 
 
Her incarnation of realism is aimed at getting out of the individualist and foundationalist 
(hierarchical and binary) assumptions that ‘prop up both traditional forms of realism and 
constructivism’ (Barad, 2007, p. 408). She writes that in an agential realist account: ‘Agency 
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is cut loose from its traditional humanist orbit. Agency is not aligned with human 
intentionality and subjectivity (ibid, p. 177). However, while the sentiment expressed here 
accords with Bogost’s abandonment of the human as ‘ontological watchmaker’ referred to 
earlier, Barad’s (2007) agential realism crystallises a divergence which produces new material 
feminism as the arch enemy of TripleO cf. Harman’s comments above – precisely because it 
commits the correlationist sin of thinking mind, word and world together. Barad’s agential 
realism proposes a posthumanist performative as a means to escape the ‘representationalist 
trap’ (ibid, p. 135) that ‘takes the notion of [human] separation as foundational’. The problem 
with humanist representationalism is, for Barad, twofold. First, representationalism makes an 
ontological separation of words from things, thereby ‘leaving itself with the dilemma of their 
linkage such that knowledge is possible’ (ibid, p. 137). Second, representational practices 
which constitute the material world, nature and matter as separate ‘objects of thought’ set 
‘man [a]s an individual apart from the rest’, bestowing on him ‘a place from which to reflect’ 
(ibid, p. 134). For Barad such reflection results in a geometrical optics that produces the same, 
and she counters this with a physical optics of diffraction that illuminates difference and 
illuminates the boundary-making practices that institute difference. The enactments of 
posthumanist agential realism, therefore, disrupts the metaphysics of individualism, and the 
tenets of humanism and representationalism that hold it in place.  
 
Agential realism ‘doesn’t presume the separateness of any-‘thing’, let alone the alleged  
spatial, ontological and epistemological distinction that sets humans apart’ (Barad, 2007, p. 
136). Barad argues that ‘matter and meaning are not separate entities’ (ibid, p. 3), and that 
‘[by] … allowing matter its due as an active participant in the world’s becoming, in its 
ongoing intra-activity [we] can think[…] the cultural and the natural together (Barad, 2007, 
pp. 135–6), a point also expressed by Timothy Morton (2010) in his ecological speculative 
realism. However, while TripleO and material feminism share a critique of human 
exceptionalism and both forcefully contest the assumption of power and privileges it has 
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enabled humans to arrogate to ourselves, from this point they shoot off in opposite directions. 
Remember that what Harman and TripleO are looking for is an a-human real in which objects 
and the world appear without us – a position that Bennett (2016 f.c.), citing Brassier, 
Weisman and Meillassoux, ultimately sees as a somewhat chilling lead-in to a post-
apocalyptic disanthropy or nihilism. Whereas for Barad (2007, p. 134) an agential realist 
critique of ‘the inheritance of distance’ leads the other way – towards a human-matter 
entanglement: a responsibility for and of the world-with-us. Like Kirby (1997, pp. 126–7), 
Barad’s account is one in which word, flesh and world are ‘utterly implicated … they are all 
emergent within a force field of differentiations that has no exteriority in any final sense’. 
Barad (2007, p. 160), thus, talks of ‘bodies being constituted along with the world, as ‘part of’ 
the world, as being-of-the-world rather than being in the world. She thinks of the ‘worlding of 
the world’ as an embodied (more-other-than-human-and-human) ethical practice, in which 
‘we are not outside observers of the world … rather we are part of the world in its ongoing 
intra-activity’ (ibid, p. 184).    
 
The agential realist cartography of worlding Barad elaborates will now be familiar to many. 
In her view, in nature there are no such things as ‘things’ i.e. entities which are have 
‘inherently determinate boundaries’ (ibid, p. 138). Instead, ‘the primary ontological unit is not 
independent objects with inherent boundaries and properties but rather phenomena’ whereby 
‘phenomena are the ontological inseparability/entanglement of intra-acting agencies’ (ibid, p. 
139). We may for a moment be tempted to think there is something going on here similar to 
the way objects ‘touch’ in TripleO but not so. An agential realist ontology maps the mutual 
constitution of subject-object always and only in/through the dynamism of their intra-active 
entailment; objects and subjects do not exist before or outside intra-actions. There is no object 
‘itself’ possessing an autonomous reality, things are not ‘separate’ from us and don’t 
‘withdraw’; they come into being through intra-actions. Individual agency is reframed as the 
co-constitution of confederate agencies in which agency is a becoming-together in an 
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‘ongoing ebb and flow’ (ibid, p. 140) (remarkably different from the ‘autonomous’ objects of 
TripleO or the actants of ANT). And while distributed agency makes it difficult to know (and 
why do we want to know?) which ‘one’ makes a ‘decision’ (and anyway what constitutes a 
decision? Ask the Ebola virus in Sierra Leone about that), agential cuts are made (sometimes 
by humans, sometimes not) which instantiate boundaries, produce properties and deliver 
differentiation, all the while remaining entangled as phenomena within apparatuses. The 
piling up’ of concepts here – phenomena, cut, intra-action, apparatus – is a Baradian feature, a 
‘personal idiosyncras[y] [of] writing style’ (Kirby, 2011, p. 82) I deal with when I am in a 
close encounter of a critical kind with Barad, my mind entangled with her words, the page, 
the book.   
 
Tom-tom. C’est moi. The blue guitar 
And I are one.  
                  Where  
Do I begin and end? And where 
 
As I strum the thing, do I pick up 
That which momentously declares  
 
Itself not to be I and yet  
Must be. It could be nothing else.  
(from Wallace Stevens, The Man With The Blue Guitar) 
 
A musing diffraction in/between TripleO and material feminism means to dispense with 
worries about questions of correspondence between descriptions and reality and revel in the 
fact that together they open a pincer movement which undoes the (man-made) ‘problem’ of 
correlationism. For Barad, it is an illusion of our own making anyway, because:  
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‘To theorize is not to leave the material world behind and enter the domain of pure ideas 
where the lofty space of the mind makes objective reflection possible. Theorizing, like 
experimenting, is a material practice,’ (Barad, 2007, p. 55).  
 
For material feminism, concepts are practices, theories are material methods for enacting life. 
The realist materialisation of thinking-in-doing/ knowing-in-being, radicalizes ontology, 
fusing it with ethics and epistemology, constituting a posthuman ethico-onto-epistem-ology, 
making all and each of us (however ‘we’ are constituted as phenomena) responsible for each 
and all of ‘us’ because ‘every intra-action matters’. She spells this out as follows: ‘realism [is] 
about the real consequences, interventions, creative possibilities, and responsibilities of intra-
acting’ (Barad, 2007, p. 37). In place of this, object-oriented ontology proposes that:  
 
‘The in-itself is real. Yet … this reality remains unattained by inanimate causal relations no 
less than by human subjects. For there is, in fact, a cotton-in-itself that withdraws from fire no 
less than from human awareness,’ (Harman, 2011, p. 137).  
 
In order to escape what Harman sees as the ‘claustrophobic honey trap’ that prevents us from 
thinking the thing-itself because we are endlessly caught up in our thinking about thinking it, 
Harman offers a ‘weird realism’ of objects ‘that shows the human-world circle to be 
indefensibly narrow’ and its representations to be ‘narrow and false’ (Harman, 2011, p. 62). 
The purpose of ‘rescuing’ objects from human thought and installing them as autonomous 
things is to ‘produce a new metaphysics able to speak of all objects and the perceptual and 
causal relations in which they become involved,’ (Harman, 2011, p. 6). 
 
I now turn to this ‘speaking of’ which I identified earlier as, in my view, a rather fatal issue 
for object-oriented ontology.  
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Landing Place 3: Weirding/ Worlding   
 
‘The objects as presented in this book are as strange as ghosts in a Japanese temple’ (Harman, 
2011, p. 6) 
 
Weird, alien, strange. These are the terms valorised by Harman (2011) and Bogost (2012) in 
their elaboration of the withdrawal of objects and their estrangement from human capture. 
How, then, can we approach the alien strangeness of withdrawn objects in the weird realism 
of object-oriented ontology? What procedures, practices or even ‘methods’ might work? 
Harman’s view is that we need to focus on allusions and in The Quadruple Object (2011, p. 
68) he writes ‘we all know of a way of speaking of a thing without quite speaking of it; 
namely, we allude to it. Allusion occurs in thinking no less than in speaking’. Interesting but 
it’s unclear where this gets us to in understanding the secret life of objects, which indeed turns 
out to be Harman’s point. We can’t ‘get’ anywhere nearer to objects or reality than we already 
are. So, access to the table (or any other object) is ‘not impossible, only that it is indirect’ 
(Harman, 2012, p. 12). The approach to objects must be ‘oblique’, and even when we are 
‘hunting’ objects we must make sure we are ‘non-lethal … since objects can never be caught’. 
They remain withdrawn from all access, making themselves available through ‘allusion and 
seducing us by means of allure’ (ibid, p. 12). Perhaps it’s me, but Harman’s objects bear some 
resemblance to the femme fatale of film noir, a dangerous enchantress attempting to elude the 
male gaze, a thing capable of reworking the sexualised norms of abjection.        
 
Bogost (2012) on the other hand, proposes a number of different strategies. Beginning with 
the damning view that ‘for too long philosophers have spun waste like a goldfish’s sphincter’, 
(Bogost, 2012, p. 110), and lamenting their allegiance to writing which he sees as a pursuit 
dangerous for the doing of philosophy, he argues that ‘real radicals … make things’. He 
adapts the homely and undoubtedly masculine notion of carpentry to ‘the practice of 
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constructing artifacts as a philosophical practice’ (ibid, p. 92) and, to exemplify this, 
constructs technological artifacts that ‘work’ without human intervention. Except that this 
‘alien phenomenology’ requires human presence to records ‘effects’. Like Harman, a seeker 
after the ghostly object, Bogost writes: 
 
The experiences of things can be characterized only by tracing the exhaust of their effects on 
the surrounding world and speculating about the coupling between that black noise and the 
experiences internal to an object (ibid, p. 100). 
 
An alien phenomenologist’s carpentry ‘offers a rendering satisfactory enough to allow the 
artifact operator to gain some insight into an alien thing’s experience (ibid, p. 100). Maybe. 
But who, I wonder, is doing the ‘rendering’? By whose criteria is this rendering deemed to be 
‘satisfactory’? And, again, who is doing the ‘speculating’? Undoubtedly Bogost himself, 
alone or in collusion with other – male? – philosopher carpenters. This is the problem I 
signalled to earlier. Bogost complains that posthumanism isn’t posthuman enough (ibid, p. 8). 
If so, that’s also the case for object-oriented ontology but in this case the human who is 
reinstalled as recorder of traces is indubitably male, embodying an opaque set of values, and 
judging from a distance.  
 
Lest this seem like a reinscription by other means of the sovereign, rational subject (as 
Alaimo [2014] suspects it is) it is worth briefly reviewing another of Bogost’s strategies: 
wonder, a stance he adopts in order to ‘respect things as things in themselves’ (ibid, p. 131). 
But this sort of wonder opposes the ‘old methods’ which illuminate and enlighten, seeking 
instead a wonder ‘that hopes to darken, to isolate, to insulate’. While I wonder where the joy 
is in this, it becomes clear that Bogost’s proposal is to replace the fiction of knowing with 
speculative fictions which gesture to ‘the awesome plenitude of the alien everyday’ (ibid, p. 
134) with its democracy of objects each of which exists within tiny ontologies that are at one 
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and the same time a dense mass and a unit or part connected to other units. Speculative 
fictions are ‘applied’ and ‘pragmatic’ (ibid, p. 29), they are metaphoric, in the vein of magic 
realism and fiction (recall what Harman said about ‘art’). In this way Bogost hopes that 
speculative realism will become a practical philosophy ‘things speculate and [speculative 
realism] speculates about how things speculate (ibid, p. 31). Such speculation, Bogost avers, 
is a funhouse mirror, where the scholar is a ‘carnival barker’ proceeding through ‘educated 
guesswork’ via creative acts which ‘earnestly but bemusedly’ approach the object through 
distortions which remain ‘a perversion of the unit’s [thing’s] sensibilities’ (ibid, p. 31). 
Speculative realism, in this iteration, is a practice of enweirding, in which the weird ‘other’ is 
approached, named, storied, fictionalised, turned into words (or ‘other’ things), but never 
known, because it remains the autonomous real in-itself. In other words, we ‘know’ about 
things – or think we do – because we (humans) make up stories, fictions, narratives about 
them. But this sounds suspiciously like what philosophy has been doing all along. And, 
despite Joy’s (2013) praise for weirding as a practice for unmooring texts from their human 
contexts which accomplishes an ungrounding of ourselves in play and pleasure, there is the 
enduring worry that, while van der Tuin (2014, p. 231) is right to say that object-oriented 
ontology, like material feminism, ‘revitalizes the question of subjectivity,’ the subjectivity 
that is ‘revitalized’ will have human lineaments, and remain – however implicitly – mired in 
his gendered magnificence.   
 
The brittlestar is not an object that withdraws. 
 
‘Brittlestars don’t have eyes, they are eyes, [it] is an animal without a brain’ … [it] can change 
its coloration in response to the available light in its surroundings, [it can] break off an 
endangered body part and regrow it … Brittlestars are living testimony to the inseparability of 
knowing, being and doing (Barad, 2007: pp. 375–380). 
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Having a compound eye as a skeletal system, it grows toward, meets, mingles with, and 
works with, the creatures who live around it, with it, on it, and the seabed and sea which it 
and they lives with/in and inhabit. In Meeting the Universe Halfway Barad (2007) makes it 
clear that the unthinking brittlestar, in simply doing what it does, makes a vital (in all senses) 
contribution to worlding the world. It is itself a doing, a part of the world’s becoming, and 
‘what’ and ‘how’ it sees/knows/feels/senses is enacted relationally and dynamically. There is 
no separation of knower, knowing and known. Agential realism figures knowing not as an 
intellectual act requiring an intellective agent but ‘an ontological performance’, a distributed 
posthuman practice of open-ended articulation. In tuning into the different differences that 
matter, the difference that the brittlestar makes to the productive livingness of its surroundings 
comes into view – diffraction disrupts representationalism, figuring each and every intra-
action an ethico-onto-epistemological matter, a quantum entanglement undoing cause and 
effect, effacing identity and sameness, reworking subjectivity as relation and ethics as 
embodied knowledge such that there is ‘no exterior position [of] contemplation … only intra-
acting from within and as part of the world in its becoming’ (Barad, 2007, p. 396).  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article I have followed St Pierre’s/ Rachjman’s advice: ‘trust that something may come 
out, though one is not yet completely sure what.’ The embodied diffractive musing 
in/between the two ‘foundational’ texts of object oriented ontology (Harman’s The Quadruple 
Object) and new material feminism (Barad’s Meeting the Universe Halfway) I have engaged 
has enabled something(s) to come out. These principally concern the ontological and 
epistemological differences in orientation towards the realm of objects, things and 
materialities. Object-oriented ontology proposes an autonomous realm of objects which, albeit 
touching each other weirdly via their sensory qualities, are cut off from thought and held at 
arm’s length, only to be known through the speculative fictions we (humans) construct about 
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them. This contrasts markedly with new material feminism’s entangled ethic of knowing-in-
being which refuses TripleO’s anti-correlationist stance in favour of a mutually constitutive 
desiring embrace of world-word-object. As a wondering without confirmation, this particular 
close encounter is an enactment of a more generous mode of critique which moves ‘beyond 
an easy sense’, shifting us away from the reductive and negative towards the ‘spreading of 
thoughts and knowledge,’ (Mazzei, 2014, p. 3). In aiming to create space for the sensory 
happening of a little slow theory, I have sought to introduce a small gust of ‘free and windy 
chaos’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p. 203) into academic article writing. The various 
Landing Places are my attempts to proceed with the care and caution Latour thought 
necessary. With that in mind, despite having an intense desire to wrest ‘weird’ from the 
speculative realists and resituate it with the feminist fore-mother of weirding, Mary Daly, I 
will pass on that for now.   
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